deconstructionism goes to court

I just found this in a practice guide. Um, hmmmmmmmmm . . .

In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69 C.2d 33, 69 C.R. 561, 442 P.2d 641, the court made a number of general observations about this confused subject:

(a) A judge who interprets a contract on the basis of its “plain meaning” does so in accordance with the judge's own linguistic education and experience, and under a judicial belief in the possibility of perfect verbal expression. “This belief is a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words.” But words “do not have absolute and constant referents,” and contractual obligations do not flow from the mere use of certain words. (69 C.2d 38.)

“This belief is a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words.” Wow.